We consider the problem of determining the individual preference rankings that are necessarily implied by a dataset consisting of prices, income distributions and total resources.
Introduction
We define the d-triple d = p, (w i ), r as a vector whose three components are: a price vector p, an income distribution vector (w i ); a total resource vector r .
In an exchange economy made of m consumers, where consumer i is characterized by the utility function u i and endowment vector ω i , any arbitrarily given price vector p defines the d-triple p, (w i ), r where w i = p · ω i and r = i ω i . The (indirect) utility of the d-triple d = p, (w i ), r for consumer i is given by the expressionv i (d) =û i (p, w i ) wherê u i is the indirect utility function associated with the direct utility function u i .
A dataset D consists of a finite number T of d-triples d t = p t , (w We consider in this paper the inverse problem of determining the individual preference rankings that are necessarily implied by a given dataset D despite the fact that individual utility functions are unknown. This problem requires the determination of the utility functions that rationalize the dataset D and may have many as well as zero solutions. Different rankings can be compatible with the dataset D and the issue in this paper is to determine them.
It is known that the equilibrium manifold determines the consumers' preferences [1, 5] . But the minimum this requires are the points of an open subset of the equilibrium manifold, i.e., an infinite number of points. If the dataset T is finite, the only results available so far are those about the "testability" of the equilibrium manifold [4] . There is a big gap between the determination of consumers' preferences and the testability issue. That gap is partially filled in by the results of the current paper on the determination of the individual rankings compatible with a finite dataset D
In applications, prices, individual incomes and aggregate demand are observable. Utility functions or preferences are not. The determination of the individual preference rankings compatible with finite datasets is therefore a precious information that is of particular interest in cost-benefit analyses and public finance for example.
The main result of this paper is the equivalence between rankings of finite datasets and existence of solutions to a set of linear equalities and inequalities. This problem has a remarkable structure from which follows that its computational complexity is relatively modest. We use this characterization to improve our understanding of the set of finite datasets compatible with given individual rankings. We show that this set is open, which implies that the compatibility of a dataset with given individual rankings is robust to perturbations. We also prove that this set is contractible, which implies in particular that it is pathconnected. The economic interest of global topological properties like contractibility, pathconnectedness and more generally, the nature of the various homology , cohomology and homotopy groups that make up the core of algebraic topology may seem remote to many economists. Nevertheless, once an economically relevant property has been identified and, here, this property is the compatibility of finite datasets with given individual rankings, the property can be identified with the set of suitably defined elements that satisfy that property. At an abstract level, this set is usually a subset of some bigger set and the issue is then to get the best "understanding" possible of that subset. For example, if equations and inequations are often used to characterize subsets of a given set, it is generally not an easy task to determine from their equations and inequations the "picture" of the subsets. Global topological properties are the tools that mathematicians have invented to bypass our visual limitations in dimensions higher than three. From that perspective, contractibility of the set of finite datasets compatible with given individual rankings is quite remarkable. Though not convex, this set has already many of the nice properties of convex sets. We also use our characterization to give an alternative proofs of the rationalizability of finite data sets when total resources are close to being collinear [3] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the main assumptions and definitions, and set the notation. Section 3 addresses the equivalence between the compatibility of finite datasets with specified individual rankings and the existence of solutions to some set of linear equalities and inequalities. Section 4 is devoted to a proof that finite datasets where total resources are collinear or almost collinear are rationalizable. Section 5 deals with the contractibility and pathconnectedness of the set of datasets compatible with a given individual rankings, a property that is applied to show the pathconnectedness of the set of rationalizable datasets. Section 6 concludes the paper with a few comments. The concepts of well ranked and strongly ranked datasets are defined in the Appendix. Their properties are a crucial ingredient of our characterization of dataset rankings.
Definitions, assumptions and notation

Goods and prices
There is a finite number of goods. Let p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p −1 , p ) ∈ R ++ be the price vector. We normalize the price vector p by picking the -th commodity as the numeraire: p = 1. Let S denote the set of strictly positive normalized price vectors.
Consumers and their utility functions
There is a finite number m ≥ 2 of consumers. A consumer is characterized by the consumption set X = R ++ , an endowment vector ω i ∈ X and a utility function u i : X → R.
We assume that consumer i 's utility function u i belongs to the class U of smooth maps from X into R that satisfy the following properties whose mathematical and economic interpretations are standard: 1) Du i (x i ) ∈ X for any x i ∈ X (smooth monotonicity); 2) The combined inequality y T D 2 u i (x i ) y ≥ 0 and equality y T Du i (x i ) = 0, where x i ∈ X, have a unique solution y = 0 ∈ R (smooth strict quasi-concavity); 3) The indifference surfaces u −1 i (a) are closed in R for all a ∈ R. (The latter condition does not follow from the continuity of u i because the consumption space X is open in R , not closed; economically, this property means that every commodity is strictly necessary.)
We denote by Ω = X m the set of endowments of all consumers.
Individual demand functions
Given the utility function u i ∈ U, the demand of consumer i for the price vector p ∈ S and income
∈ Ω denote the vector of individual endowments. The equilibrium manifold is the subset of S × Ω that consists of the elements (p, ω) that satisfy equation
Feasible and equilibrium d-triples
++ denote the income distribution between the m consumers making up the economy.
The d-triple (p, (w i ), r ) ∈ S × R m ++ × X is feasible if the equality
is satisfied. Note that the definition of feasibility does not require utility functions.
is satisfied. It follows from Walras law satisfied by the individual demand functions that an equilibrium d-triple is feasible.
Datasets
From now on, we consider datasets
The set of these datasets is denoted by D while E(u) [T ] represents the subset of elements of D whose components are equilibrium d-triples for the utility profile u = (u 1 , . . . , u m ) ∈ U m . The utility profile u = (u i ) ∈ U m then rationalizes the dataset D. We also introduce the set
Datasets and compatible preference (pre)orderings
. The rankinĝ
of the indirect utility levelsv i (d t ) defines a preordering i on the set T. The consumers' preference preorderings of the dataset D (given the utility profile u = (u 1 , . . . , u m ) ∈ U m ) is the m-tuple = ( i ) defined by the m consumers' preorderings of the set T.
An ordering is a preordering that is antisymmetric (i.e., t i t and t i t imply t = t ). The ordering ≺ i is a refinement of the preordering i if t ≺ i t implies t i t . Note that any preordering can be refined into an ordering.
It will be important in the sequel to differentiate orderings from preorderings. We will use the notation ≺ = (≺ i ) for orderings of the dataset D.
Compatibility of datasets and preference (pre)orderings
The main result of this section is the equivalence between the compatibility of a given dataset D with the preference ordering ≺ = (≺ i ) and the solution of a set of linear equalities and inequalities.
3.1. A set of linear equalities and inequalities Theorem 1. Let ≺ = (≺ i ) be some preference ordering of the set T.
There exists a utility profile u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u m ) ∈ U m inducing the preference ordering ≺ = (≺ i ) if and only if the system of linear equalities and inequalities
has a solution (x t i ) , with 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. The condition is necessary. Let
). Equality (L3) follows from the equilibrium condition. Equality (L2) follows from Walras law. Inequality (L1) then follows from inequality u i (x
The condition is sufficient. Pick some arbitrary consumer i . We use equality (L2) to substitute p t ·x t i to w t i in inequality (L1). The collection of inequalities (L1) implies that the data (p t , x t i ) are well-ranked for the ordered index set (T,
Extension to preference preorderings
The following Proposition enables us to use Theorem 1 in the case of preorderings instead of orderings. Proposition 1. Let = ( i ) be some preference preordering of the set T associated with the utility profile u = (u i ) ∈ U m . Then, for any ordering ≺ = (≺ i ) that is a refinement of the preordering = ( i ), there exists a utility profile u = (u i ) ∈ U m such that the dataset D belongs to E
[T ] (u ) and the induced preference ranking coincides with the ordering ≺ = (≺ i ).
Proof. This is essentially Proposition A.8 of the Appendix.
The following corollary is just a reformulation of Proposition 1. Corollary 1. Any dataset D that is rationalized by the utility profile u = (u i ) that induces a preference preordering can be rationalized by another utility profile u = (u i ) such that the induced preference preordering of the datasets is actually an ordering.
Proposition 1 enables us to check the compatibility of the dataset D with the preference preordering = ( i ) by reducing this question to the compatibility of the dataset D with any preference ordering ( ≺) = (≺ i ) that is a refinement of = ( i ). We solve the latter question by applying Theorem 1.
Structure and size of the linear programming problem
Checking whether the linear system LP (D, ≺) has a solution is equivalent to solving a linear programming problem. This problem has m T real unknowns and m T + T + mT (T + 1)/2 constraints (including the sign constraints). For a given economy, m and are constant and the only variable parameter is the number T of equilibrium data. The numbers of unknowns and constraints are linear and quadratic respectively in T . This situation is similar to the one observed by Varian [7] for Afriat's inequalities in the case of one consumer. But, at variance with Afriat's set of inequalities that are practically impossible to solve for large T because of the size of the problem, the set of inequalities and equalities in Theorem (1) decomposes into T smaller linear subproblems.
The number of unknowns of each subproblem is equal to m while the number of constraints varies from m + + m to m + + mT depending on the value of t and of the ranking profile ≺. The average value of the number of constraints is therefore equal to m + + mT /2. Both average and maximal values are linear in T . This makes each one of the linear subproblems far more tractable than the general problem, an advantage that more than compensates for the fact that there exist T such problems.
The set of rationalizable datasets and related sets
Given the preference ordering ≺= (≺ i ), we denote by E
[T ] ≺ the set of T pairwise distinct datasets D ∈ D that are compatible with the preference ordering ≺. It would be most interesting to have a precise description of the set E
[T ] ≺ as as subset of D. Such description is impossible. The best we can hope for at the moment are some global topological properties of the set E
[T ] ≺ like pathconnectedness or contractibility. We investigate these properties using the characterization provided by Theorem 1.
Recall that E [T ] denotes the set of T pairwise distinct rationalizable datasets D ∈ D. We then have:
Proof. Obvious given Proposition 1 and the discussion that followed.
Proposition 2 enables us to derive properties of the set of rationalizable data E [T ] from those of the sets (E [T ] ≺ , sets for which we can use Theorem 1.
Openness of the set of datasets compatible with a given preference preordering
Theorem 1 tells us that the set E [T ] ≺ consists of the datasets D such that the set defined by the linear system LP (D, ≺) is non empty. We are going to apply this characterization to prove the following proposition:
Proof. Let us show that if D = (p t , (w Equalities L2 and L3 are satisfied by construction and L1 is satisfied because these inequalities are strict for D sufficiently close to D.
An obvious consequence of this proposition is:
Corollary 2. The set of rationalizable datasets E [T ] is open in D.
Rationalizability of datasets with collinear total resources
Theorem 2. Let D = (d t ) 1≤t≤T be a dataset such that the total resources r t are all collinear. The dataset D is then rationalizable.
The vectors of total resources r t are all collinear with some vector r ∈ X. Let us define x t i ∈ X and λ t i > 0 by
The following lemma is obvious: Lemma 1. Generically on D, the λ t i are pairwise distinct. Proof of Theorem 2. It follows from Lemma 1 combined with Proposition 3 that we can assume that the dataset D is such that the λ t i 's are pairwise distinct. They then define for each consumer i the ordering ≺ i of the set T:
It then suffices to check that (x t i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ T is a solution of the linear system LP (D, ≺), which is obvious.
Topological properties of sets of compatible and rationalizable datasets
We now apply Theorem 1 to get a simple proof of the contractibility of E [T ] ≺ . In a second stage, this property is used to prove the pathconnectedness of the set of rationalizable datasets E
[T ] .
Contractibility of E
The topological space Z is said to be contractible if there exists a continuous map h : Z × [0, 1] → Z that satisfies the following properties: 1) h(., 1) is the identity map of Z, i.e., h(., 1) = id Z ; 2) h(z, 0) = z 0 ∈ Z for z ∈ Z and some z 0 ∈ Z. The intuition behind this definition is that a contractible space can be continuously deformed into a point, here the point z 0 .
A related idea is the one of a deformation retract. By definition, the topological subspace Z 0 of Z is a deformation retract if there exists a continuous map h : Z × [0, 1] → Z that satisfies the following properties: 1) h(., 1) is the identity map of Z, i.e., h(., 1) = id Z ; 2) h(z, 0) ∈ Z 0 for z ∈ Z; 3) h(z, 0) = z for all z ∈ Z 0 . If the subspace Z 0 is a deformation retract of Z and is contractible, then Z is also contractible. (First, contract Z to Z 0 , and then Z 0 to a point.)
It is intuitively clear and almost obvious that a contractible space is pathconnected.
Proof. It suffices to observe that the linear system LP (D, ≺) in Theorem 1 is linear with respect to x t i and w t i .
We now define special datasets that belong to the set E [T ] ≺ for a given ordering ≺ = (≺ i ). Let t i 1 ≺ i t i 2 ≺ i · · · ≺ i t i T represent the ordering ≺ i . Let (µ t i 1 , µ t i 2 , . . . , µ t i T ) be a strictly increasing sequence of strictly positive (real) numbers:
Let τ i ∈ X be some strictly positive vector. Define the vector x * t i = µ t τ i ∈ X. The sequence x * t i satisfies the strict (vector) inequalities
Proof. This is essentially a rehash of Theorem 2.
Proof of the contractibility property
Proof of Proposition 4. Let X 0 be the subset of E 
. These two maps are continuous, which proves that X 0 is homeomorphic to S m and is therefore contractible as a Cartesian product of contractible spaces.
We now define the map h :
where p = (p t ) is fixed. This map is clearly continuous. In addition,
≺ by the map h. The set X 0 being contractible, the set E
[T ] ≺ itself is contractible.
Pathconnectedness of the set of rationalizable datasets
Lemma 4. The intersection
is non empty.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to identify a datasetD ∈ E [T ] that is compatible with all possible preference orderings ≺.
Step 1. Let u ∈ U be some arbitrary utility function. Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t , . . . , x T be T distinct consumption bundles in X yielding the same utility level:
). Let p t be the supporting price vector of x t for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The strict inequality p t · x t < p t · x t for t = t follows from the strict quasi-concavity of the utility function u combined with x t = x t (and u(x t ) = u(x t )).
Step 2. These inequalities imply as a special case the inequalities
Step 3. LetD be the dataset (p t , (w
for t varying from 1 to T . Let also u = (u, u, . . . , u) denote the utility profile associated with each consumer having u ∈ U as utility function. Let x t i = x t for i = 1, 2, . . . , m and t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Then, it is obvious that (x t i ) with 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ T is a solution of the linear system LP (D, ≺) for any preference ordering ≺. We conclude by applying Theorem 1.
We can now prove: 
Concluding comments
The analysis developed in this paper has been limited to the pure exchange model. Obviously, serious attempts at applying our analysis to real world data should consider extending our theoretical results to economies that are more complex than the pure exchange ones. Production should explicitely be taken into account. More generally, theoretical developments should exploit the structures induced by time and uncertainty up to the operation of asset markets. This paper should be seen as a feasibility study for such an approach.
It follows readily from the (T − 1) 2 inequalities (5) that x t i is supported for the utility function u i by the price vector p t , with 1 ≤ t ≤ T . This implies that the price-consumption data are rationalized by the utility function u i ∈ U pl . The proof consists therefore in finding these coefficients a t and b t with 1 ≤ t ≤ T . It starts with a 1 and b 1 arbitrary > 0, the computation of the other coefficients proceeding by induction on T . Case T = 2. Let a 2 = a 1 + b 1 p 1 · x
One checks readily that these strongly ranked data and the pair (p 1 , x 1 i ) of the original data set define a set of data that are well-ranked for the ordered set (J , ≺) = {1} ∪ (J , ≺) with 1 ≺ t for t ∈ J .
Let us show that these data are either strongly ranked for the ordered index set (J , ≺) or that we can find an additional pair (p A12 , x A12 i
